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ABSTRACT: This article argues American military strategists must
incorporate multidimensional power projection into their planning
processes to counter adversarial actions by gray-zone actors. By
developing a more complete concept of power projection, the
United States can apply its resources more effectively.

T

he United States faces coercive gradualism in the South China Sea,
nuclear provocation by a rogue state on the Korean peninsula,
and gray-zone aggression in the Ukraine and the Levant. In these
challenges, our adversaries purposefully occupy the space between war
and peace. They negate US military advantages by operating below the
threshold of armed conflict and through means designed to avoid, or
be immune to, combat power. America’s deterrence posture is likewise
becoming irrelevant because its adversaries operate successfully without
resorting to war.
At root, these diverse challenges target Pax Americana—the
networks of allies, systems of international diplomacy, commerce, and
law, as well as large swaths of territory and the resources they encompass.
Without a redesign of American global strategy, these networks and
resources could be lost. Accordingly, campaign planning must unify
power projection across all dimensions to press US advantages, defeat
adversaries, and maintain the desired strategic balance. In summary,
the United States must campaign against adversarial states and
nonstate actors, organizations, and individuals. The United States must
successfully operate in environments of intentional ambiguity, opacity,
and asymmetry, and do so without its most powerful weapons.
America’s rivals use various types of unrestricted warfare to achieve
a competitive, risk-adjusted advantage.1 To defeat these actors, the US
concept of power must expand to encompass an almost unlimited array
of dimensions of power such that the lines between hard and soft,
kinetic and nonkinetic will blur. The US concept of power projection
must expand from direct source-to-target frameworks and encompass
indirect and intermediated projection through networks and systems.
America must be able to orchestrate the interactions between its power
and its projection of that power on guidance, delivery, and effects by
employing spatial, nonspatial, hybrid, and complex projection means.
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For these reasons, American analysts, planners, and practitioners
require a framework that enhances exploitable advantages over our
adversaries and that supports the design, development, and execution
of campaigns that capitalize on those advantages. This framework must
integrate power projection at its most granular: payloads combined
with projection vectors in specific dimensions, in a timely manner, to
form global campaigns of joint distributions of power across multiple
dimensions. This model must combine the arrays of power with the
mechanics of projection by vector, through networks, and across systems
while accounting for impediments like opacity, agency, and asymmetry.

Multidimensionality

We live in a multidimensional world. Typically, we campaign on land
and sea and in air and space. But information has become a new campaign front. It challenges us to think beyond geographically tethered
information to nonspatial information and from singular, granular data
to large scale, millennia-old nontangible systems like religion, finance,
and diplomacy as means for power projection. Multidimensionality
exists, in a nascent form, within current military planning as DIMEFIL
(diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and
law enforcement). A complete spectrum of power projection extends
DIMEFIL infinitely to include all dimensions offering all exploitable
advantages, whether structural or transient.
Power is applied to a target in order to bring about a desired
change in its state. Power projection is the process of delivering single
or multiple instances of power within a dimension. Multidimensional
power projection is this process extended across multiple dimensions
and described through four essential elements: class, source, payload,
and vector. Class defines the behavior of power against a target’s state.
Both a bullet driven by gunpowder and a bayonet driven by musclepower deliver kinetic energy to a target, thereby changing its state.
The behavior of the bullet and the bayonet against the target is
kinetic, and accordingly, their class is kinetic. In one case, the payload is a
bullet traveling along a ballistic path. In the other, a bayonet follows the
arc of human physiology. Both the bullet and the bayonet are payloads;
the path and the arc are projection vectors. A source is the initiator of an
instance of power projection—shooting a bullet, thrusting a bayonet.
A soldier, a policeman, and a criminal each possess and can initiate an
instance of kinetic power projection.

Projection Vectors

Projection vectors implement a class of behavior on a payload within
a specific dimension. The pistol’s barrel directs kinetic force (class)
applied to a bullet (payload) creating a ballistic path (vector) within a
kinetic dimension. An ambassador (source) hand-delivering (vector)
a demarche (payload) to a rival’s representative (target) is an instance
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of diplomatic power, formal communication by a sovereign entity in a
diplomatic dimension.
Projection vectors, like all vectors, have an angle and a length.
Direct bilateral projection, from source to target, is a zero-angle vector.
We tend to think of power projection as a single instance of a payload
traveling a vector from source to target, like a package delivered by
a courier or an artillery shell fired from a cannon. But force can be
applied on a payload by the target, pulled rather than pushed. If the
target has an affinity for something, perhaps bulk cash, and a payload is
designed to contain or display such characteristics, the target may pull,
move, or capture the payload by expending resources in the projection
dimension. Absent applied force, a payload remains static. A payload
in motion tends to remain in motion so long as the forces applied to it
exceed the friction of forces along its path.

Networks

In simple terms, networks are collections of entities and connections
(nodes and edges). Without networks, projection remains bilateral.
Networked power projection offers a multiplicity of paths to the target,
which may include indirect, nonspatial, and complex multidimensional
paths. Multiple paths in multiple dimensions require multiple vectors,
each operating within the dimension of the connection between
networked entities. Networked power projection delivers a number of
offensive advantages such as expanding the number of geometric paths
that make defense increasingly difficult. The use of friendly, neutral, and
hostile intermediating entities may mask power’s origin.
Networked multidimensional power can come from areas and in
forms outside of the antagonist’s expectation, awareness, or collection
capabilities. Projecting power through a network requires understanding
how payloads interact with intermediating entities, possibly requiring
semiautonomous or autonomous guidance for the payload. Networked
power projection also requires planning for the comparative velocities
of each payload. Multidimensional shock effect, where payloads from
multiple dimensions arrive on target at the same time amplifies results
and is a planning consideration.

Systems

Systems are subsets of networks. Manufactured systems, like
those of Pax Americana, are created and maintained because they
offer a positive net benefit, obtained through transformation, to their
participants. Systems—such as the global maritime commons—are not
necessarily bound by geographic or spatial limits. Systems—such as
transnational supply chains that manage factors like risk, demand, and
ownership—have a nonspatial aspect. Once created, these systems tend
toward stability as a means of preserving their benefits, and they react
against changes that pose a risk to their purpose and their transformative
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processes. Consequently, they can be harnessed through their tendency
to maintain their present state.
Systems contain the potential for several types of systemic failures:
cascades, contagions, and “black swans.” Cascading failures occur when
one fault within a system causes subsequent multiple failures. System
contagions occur when a system’s nodes, edges, and edge characteristics
are exploited to propagate effects antithetical to its purpose.
The Great Depression (1929–39) offers a contagion example. When
a local bank failed, all its debt, typically borrowings from other banks,
did not get repaid. The holders of that debt, regional banks, then failed
and their debts had to be written off. When regional banks failed,
their creditors, money-center banks, either failed or sold their debt and
ceased lending. The resulting credit contraction spurred more local
and regional bank failures. Generally, contagions spread an infection
through horizontal, peer-to-peer relationships, while cascade failures
occur in vertically integrated systems like supply chains.2 Black swans
are unpredictable outliers that are typically more than three standard
deviations out from a distribution’s mean: “Nothing in the past can
convincingly point to [their] possibility.” Yet these events, such as the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the Fukushima accident,
make “an extreme impact.” 3

Illustrating Multidimensionality in the Middle East

Multidimensional campaign planning can take place once the
analyst, planner, or practitioner develops an appreciation for the class,
source, payload, and vector of power projection, both inside and outside
networks and systems. With this understanding, the Israelis might
consider employing a persistent, multidimensional campaign against
the Iranian state to interdict, undermine, or collapse the missile and
rocket supply chains inside Iran instead of relying upon habitual airstrikes in Syria.
Likewise, Saudi Arabia could construct a financial cordon sanitaire
to constrain Iran’s use of external financial proxies such as the Omani
rial as well as to interdict bonds issued to develop the South Pars gas
field.4 Added to a range of physical, informational, financial, kinetic,
and electronic dimensional campaigns, Saudi Arabia and Israel jointly
may be able to contain Iranian actions while creating a series of selfamplifying cascade failures to roll back Iran’s foreign adventurism.

2      Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Blackouts and Cascading Failures of the Global Markets,” Scientific American,
January 1, 2009.
3      Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable,” New York
Times, April 22, 2007.
4      Majority Report on the Review of U.S. Treasury Department’s License To Convert Iranian Assets Using the
U.S. Financial System by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Washington, DC: Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2018).
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Using Multidimensionality in the South China Sea

China’s dominance in the South and East China Seas appears to be
a “wicked problem” when viewed conventionally.5 China’s segmentation
of the South and East China Seas from the global maritime commons
included constructing in-depth missile and submarine coverage; using
the deniable actions of the maritime militia’s “little blue men” to harass,
ram, and sink civilian and sovereign ships; declaring an air defense
identification zone; and building militarized islands in the Spratly and
Paracel Islands.6
China established a corresponding legal basis for its strategy and
actions in 1992, 1996, and 1998 when it crafted legislation to assume
regulatory and maritime law enforcement jurisdiction. With its own
sovereign claim and subsequent legal justification, China has pursued
operational jurisdiction of its near seas through civil maritime rights
enforcement.7 China’s actions, all below the level of armed conflict,
are creating two separate and ultimately incompatible systems—the
Chinese dominion of its near seas and the international rule of the global
maritime commons.
One example of system-level power projection appropriate for
the situation in the South and East China Seas would be the US Navy
maintaining maritime presence and movement as well as conducting
information operations across legal, economic, and financial dimensions
below the level of armed conflict. In this manner, the United States can
help other countries in the region maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific”
to “win before fighting.” 8 From a multidimensional perspective, Chinese
strategy is based upon a profound and fundamental miscalculation that
will ultimately cause its unraveling.
China’s physical and legal segmentation of its near seas has
resulted in a new system boundary that can be exploited to US
advantage. On one side, the maritime commons is a globally scaled,
integrated system of shipborne freight distribution, economic trade,
and financial risk management whose physical passage is guaranteed
under US stewardship and whose contractual redress operates under
long-established, internationally accepted law. On the other side, the
emerging Chinese dominion is an extension of recent Chinese law
backed by regular and irregular force. Ninety-five percent of China’s
5      John C. Camillus, “Strategy as a Wicked Problem,” Harvard Business Review, accessed
April 18, 2019.
6      Department of Defense (DoD), The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S.
National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment (Washington, DC: DoD, 2015), 16; Andrew S.
Erickson and Kevin Bond, “Dredging under the Radar: China Expands South Sea Foothold,”
National Interest, August 26, 2015; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Update: China’s Big Three
Near Completion,” Center for International and Strategic Studies, June 29, 2017; and Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2018, annual report (Washington, DC: OSD, 2018), 12.
7      M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33,
no. 3 (December 2011): 293, 303.
8      Hearing on the United States Indo-Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea, 116th Cong. 12
(2019) (statement of ADM Philip S. Davidson, commander, US Indo-Pacific Command).
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foreign trade is seagoing freight contributing more than $2.2 trillion
to China’s gross domestic product; more than 50 percent of that trade
crosses the maritime boundary.9
Using presence and movement, US maritime power projection can
exploit system advantages short of armed conflict (Class: Physical; Source:
US Navy; Payload: Short-term, random, maritime exclusionary zones on
outbound China container ship routes inside the global commons and
outside the force projection range of the Chinese navy; Vector: Military
exercises and maritime law enforcement). These diversions increase the
distances and the durations of container ship voyages—which in turn,
increase the expenses for fuel, labor, and insurance—to deliver real-time
boundary costs that can be matched to China’s gray-zone actions. Russia’s
actions against ships bound for the Ukrainian ports of Berdyansk and
Mariupol demonstrate the costs imposed by such actions.10
Even a single-day diversion increases the costs associated with
keeping merchandise in inventory: the longer voyage not only prevents
cargo from reaching its destination port and being sold on schedule
but also drives up expenses resulting from financing acquisition costs
and shipping fees within the supply chain. If the delays are significant,
forward contracts, financial instruments used to safeguard against prices
changing while merchandise is in transit, may even expire before the
ship reaches port. Fortunately, extensions on these protections can be
purchased—for a “small” fee.
The expenses resulting from the diversion can be amplified
through financial power projection to deliver significantly higher costs
to China’s exports and gross domestic product. A military agency
that requires bunker fuel, Military Sealift Command perhaps, could
increase regional buys of the commodity, which is subject to financial
speculation, immediately before exclusionary zones are established to
drive the price of the resource up (Class: Financial, Source: Military,
Payload: Cost increase, Vector: Purchase). Hedge funds and commodity
brokers sensing a price movement caused by financial power projection
may buy fuel futures hoping to profit from the price change, driving
the price even higher. This scenario provides an example of planned
financial-military power projection naturally stimulating the financialcommercial dimension.
A declaration by the US Department of State of increased risk in
the western Pacific due to militant actions in China’s near seas publicly
justifies the military establishment of exclusionary zones to mitigate the
risk associated with maritime exercises (Class: Diplomatic, Source: US
State Department, Payload: Public declaration, Vector: Media). Such an
action may result in insurance companies raising their rates, making
maritime insurance more expensive and possibly more difficult to
9      “China Trade Profile,” World Trade Organization, accessed March 12, 2019; David C.
Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: Thinking Through the
Unthinkable (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 43.
10      Ihor Kabanenko, “Russia’s ‘Boa Constrictor’ Strategy in the Sea of Azov: A Prelude to
Amphibious Landings?,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 89 (June 2018).
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obtain. If risk along a transit route becomes greater, and consequently
more expensive, the costs of shipping and financing goods on that route
likewise increase, and forward contracts may become scarce. In this
example, one instance of a maritime exclusion zone tees up potential
cascades of additional power projections through the informational and
financial networks integrated within the global maritime commons.
Although physical maritime diversions, by nature, affect the
outbound merchandise shipped at the end of supply chains, payloads and
projection vectors can also be designed for upstream processes related
to manufacturing, logistics, or material handling. Interventions—such
as buying or selling primary components of targeted supply chains,
contracting services associated with paired logistics chains, and trading
financial instruments of associated companies—could induce cascading
economic and financial failures and contagions (Class: Financial,
Source: Commercial, Payload: Stock-out/Supply Glut, Vector: Purchase
order). In this context, shipping containers (onboard and in-port),
freight space, bunker fuel, repair parts, stocks, bonds, insurance, loans,
derivatives, futures, forwards, and swaps become targets. When physical
maritime diversions target outbound container ships, ancillary power
projections can target the individual components of China’s exportdriven supply chains.
The integrated, multidimensional power projection, which is all
nonkinetic, demonstrates how America can extract real costs from
China’s export-driven economy. Furthermore, the United States has an
inherent capability to scale the process and its effects through multiple
exclusionary zones to escalate the effects from one container ship to
many, one supply chain to many. Another benefit of brief maritime
diversions is a lower probability of unwanted escalation than other
physical interventions since such actions do not constitute a blockade
nor an embargo and do occur outside the range of China’s blue water
navy as well as at the limit of its missile range. In this case, unified
multidimensional power projection delivers a cost not a threat because
it does not change “the distribution of power during the crisis.” 11
Ultimately, any antagonist’s ability to respond in kind to this scenario is
limited to the reach of its physical power projection capabilities.

Conclusions

Multidimensionality and its essential elements of class, source,
payload, and projection vector offers a simple but abstract means
for analyzing, designing, and modeling unified, multidimensional
campaigns. It enables the tailored application of power using any and all
exploitable advantages across a spectrum of cooperation, competition,
conflict, and combat. Multidimensionality designed for networked and
systemic power projection offers a number of advantages: multiple
paths to the target; indirect, complex, and nonspatial paths; multiple
11      Branislav L. Slantchev, Military Threats: The Cost of Coercion and the Price of Peace (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 66.
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projection vector types; and ballistic, semiautonomous, and autonomous
guidance options.
In designing campaigns against states and their diffused nonstate
power, our campaigns must join military, whole of governmental, and
nationally sourced economic and financial power with extra national
networks and systems. Our campaign planning must unify power
projection across all dimensions to press our advantages, defeat our
adversaries, and maintain our desired strategic balance. In an era of
coercive gradualism, nuclear provocation, and gray-zone competition
that purposefully occupies the space between war and peace,
dimensionality may offer a better, more innovative and imaginative way
to respond to some of the world’s worst actors, while reducing risk and
promoting peace.

